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Five years ago, Russia replaced its old graduated
personal income tax by one with a single flat rate of
13 percent. Following the reform, compliance im-
proved, tax revenues shot up, and GDP grew dra-
matically. Is it then true, as often claimed, that Rus-
sia’s example testifies to the economic power of the
flat tax?1 Our short answer is “no”. In this note, we
examine the limited research and information avail-
able on the effects of the Russian tax reform of 2001
and present five main conclusions:
1) The change in the personal income tax was not a
stand-alone reform but only one element in a
comprehensive set of fiscal reforms.
2) The personal income tax component of the re-
form package involved more than the introduc-
tion of a low, flat tax rate. Capital income loop-
holes were closed, and tax rates on most capital
income were raised. Radical changes were made
in tax administration and enforcement.
3) The increase in compliance that followed the 2001
reform is more likely attributable to changes in
the administration and enforcement of tax laws
than to lower rates.
4) The tax rate reductions had little if any effect on
labor supply.
5) Economic growth had begun well before the re-
forms were introduced. GDP grew twice as fast
before the income tax reform as it did after.2
The Russian tax system in the 1990s3
To understand the relative importance of various as-
pects of the 2001 reforms,it is useful to step back and
examine the pre-reform situation. The Russian tax
system in the 1990s was stunningly primitive.
Administration and enforcement were notoriously
weak.The very legal basis for tax collection and au-
diting was severely limited.Taxpayer IDs did not ex-
ist. Tax rates were punitively high and took particu-
larly damaging forms, such as turnover (gross re-
ceipt) taxes that hit even those firms that were losing
money.
The results are predictable. Graft, corruption, eva-
sion, and delinquency were rampant. When they did
pay at all, large taxpayers typically negotiated pay-
ments independently of their actual obligations. A
common practice was to offset tax obligations against
goods or services delivered to the government. Only
in some cases had those goods actually been ordered
in government procurement orders. Frequently the
cash-strapped enterprises offered the goods – mainly
goods that were otherwise unmarketable – after they
had been declared delinquent.
The problems of tax collection were broadly recog-
nized.In early 1996 President Boris Yeltsin appointed
a blue-ribbon commission to investigate the largest
corporate taxpayers in the country (Karpov 1997).
Presenting its report after an 18-month study,the pan-
el found that during the period of review, these large
enterprises paid less than 8 percent (!) of their tax
bills in actual cash.They simply did not pay 29 percent
of their obligations at all, while “paying” the remain-
ing 63 percent in the form of offsets and barter goods.
The market value of the goods delivered was far be-
low the nominal price used in the offsets, leaving the
government with substantially less in real revenues
than officially accounted for.
The federal government was particularly victimized
by these schemes. Enterprises frequently colluded
with regional and local officials to hide income and
hence keep revenues away from the federal govern-
ment for taxes whose revenues were split between
local and national authorities. In other cases, local
governments demanded that enterprises pay their
taxes in the form of goods and services that could
only be used locally and not be shared with the fed-
eral government (for instance, by providing road
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1 In the United States,these claims are most frequently heard from
supporters of the Hall-Rabushka (1995) flat tax.Some assert direct
causality between the introduction of the Russian tax and the im-
provements in the economy (Mitchell 2003).Others simply link the
two repeatedly, being careful never to explicitly assert causation
(Rabushka 2002, for example).
2 In the six quarters leading up to 1 January 2001, when the “flat
tax” reform came into effect, Russia’s GDP grew at an average an-
nual rate of 10.6 percent. In the six quarters immediately following
the introduction of the new tax,it grew at a 4.7 percent annual rate. 3 See Gaddy and Ickes (2002) and Chua (2003) for more details.construction or repairs of buildings). Often, if the
federal government received anything at all in these
schemes, it was only what the regional governments
did not want.4
As a result of these practices,the Russian budget ran
massive deficits. Even using the inflated prices used
in the offset deals, federal revenues plummeted –
from 16.2 percent of GDP in 1995 to 12.4 percent in
1998. To finance its deficits, the government had re-
sorted to extensive borrowing outside and inside
Russia at increasing and unsustainably high costs,
thus digging itself even deeper in debt. Finally, on 
17 August 1998, the government defaulted on about
$40 billion worth of its own ruble-denominated debt
instruments (so-called GKOs), around $17 billion of
which were held by foreigners.
Following the debt crisis, and a brief period of near-
paralysis of the economy,Yeltsin addressed the fiscal
situation with new determination. Over the next
year, he tapped three successive representatives of
the police and security agencies to serve as prime
minister. The last of these was Vladimir Putin, then
head of the Federal Security Service,successor to the
KGB. In December 1999 Yeltsin announced his own
retirement, to take effect on 1 January 2000, and he
appointed Putin as acting president.
Under Putin the Russian government showed even
greater resolve to deal with tax enforcement issues.
In his first presidential state of the union message,
Putin declared that compliance with the new tax law,
then about to be adopted by the parliament, was a
civic duty of all Russians (Putin 2000). He accompa-
nied his moral exhortations with a high-profile pub-
lic relations campaign to raise the profile, prestige,
and power of tax enforcement agencies. A typical
measure was his decree in early 2000, designating
March 18 as a new “professional holiday”:the Day of
the Tax Police.At the same time,the tax police began
asserting themselves with respect to both corporate
and individual taxpayers.Oil companies were threat-
ened with denial of access to export pipelines if they
failed to pay taxes. In June 2000, six months before
the 2001 reforms took effect,the tax police began as-
sembling detailed personal data on taxpayers in the
city of Moscow. Senior tax officials stated that the
campaign was part of “an effort to clamp down on
the widespread practice in Moscow of wealthy indi-
viduals sheltering income” (Jack 2000).
The 2001 reforms5
The new tax law enacted in July 2000 and brought in-
to force at the beginning of 2001 changed both the
structure and administration of taxes. The personal
income tax (PIT), which had been a graduated tax
with marginal rates of 12, 20 and 30 percent, was re-
placed by one with a flat rate of 13 percent. The re-
forms also widened the tax base by eliminating many
deductions and exemptions. Prior to the reform, the
average tax rate was 14 percent,so the net change in
average tax rates was small.
Capital income was taxed at higher rates,though,and
these rates generally increased in 2001. The tax rate
on dividends was raised from 15 percent to 30 per-
cent. The corporate tax rate remained at 30 percent,
but municipalities were allowed to, and did, impose
an additional 5 percent tax. Other forms of personal
income, such as gambling, lotteries, insurance, below-
market-rate loans, and excessive bank interest pay-
ments, faced tax rates of 35 percent, in an effort to
shut down some particularly creative avoidance
schemes.6
Despite the flat rate, these reforms do not add up to
a Hall-Rabushka (HR) flat tax. The HR flat tax is a
two-part value-added tax, in which all nonwage val-
ue added is taxed at the firm level, while wages, less
personal exemptions, are taxed at the individual lev-
el. But Russia not only had the PIT, it also had a sep-
arate VAT and a separate corporate income tax.
Moreover, the 2001 changes increased the taxation
of capital income at the individual level, rather than
setting it to zero, as under the HR tax.
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4 In one notorious case, the oblast (province) government of
Samara had permitted enterprises to pay their regional taxes in the
form of goods. One of the items offered turned out to be ten tons
of toxic chemicals from a local chemical plant.Although the plant
claimed (and was given) credit for 400 million rubles [$80,000] in
taxes, auditors later determined that the chemicals were worthless
(and indeed dangerous). The Samara government never suffered
from this curious deal, however, since it had previously sought and
received permission from the federal ministry of labor to fulfill its
obligations to the federal unemployment compensation fund by de-
livering goods instead of money.Among the goods it offered were
... the ten tons of toxic chemicals. (Gaddy and Ickes 2002, 176).
5 See Ivanovo et al. (2005) for details.
6 These avoidance schemes are interesting in their own right and
suggest what might occur in a system where only wages were taxed.
Take,for instance,the insurance scheme.As explained to us by one
Russian tax expert, a not atypical arrangement would have a firm
buying an “insurance policy” that was virtually certain not to pay
off, and its workers buying a different policy from the same “insur-
ance company”– usually an entity created by the firm solely for the
purpose of executing this scheme – that was almost certain to pay
off. In such a transaction,the firm effectively transfers resources to
the workers,just like a wage payment.Meanwhile,the firm receives
a deduction for the insurance purchase (as it does for wages),while
the insurance payment would not be taxed under a wage tax.CESifo DICE Report 1/2006 47
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Other taxes were altered as well. Deductions and ex-
emptions in the VAT were reduced. The tax rate on
cigarettes and gasoline increased.Some taxes were re-
duced significantly. Before the reform, social insur-
ance taxes were a flat 39.5 percent (combined em-
ployer and employee rates, measured on a tax-exclu-
sive basis). After the reform, these were changed to 
a sharply regressive structure, with rates starting at 
35.6 percent and falling to 5 percent.Also, one tax on
business turnover (gross receipts) was eliminated,and
another reduced (and then repealed in 2003).
Probably even more important than changes to the
structure of taxation were the enforcement and ad-
ministrative changes that continued the efforts noted
in the pre-2001 period.First,the law provided for the
introduction of a common taxpayer ID number.Sec-
ond, the law allowed tax authorities to assess tax lia-
bilities indirectly – for example,when they could not
secure entry to a taxpayer’s premises.Third, the law
authorized tax audits when sufficient evidence of a
tax or nontax crime was available.
Other administrative changes would help collect PIT
revenues in particular. Taxes on all income paid to
private individuals – including taxes on interest pay-
ments and dividends – were to be withheld at source.7
Also, the revenue sharing rules were changed. By giv-
ing regional governments nearly 100 percent of PIT
revenues instead of the previous 80 percent, the law
removed the incentive of subnational governments to
help local taxpayers hide income from national au-
thorities.
The four different social insurance taxes whose com-
bined rates were reduced also had their bases con-
formed to each other and to the measure of wages in
the income tax.This likely simplified compliance and
made enforcement easier.
Finally,a discussion of enforcement would not be com-
plete without reference to the increased atmosphere
of tighter control and even coercion that character-
ized the Putin regime from the beginning. One news-
paper account told of a decision by Putin’s newly ap-
pointed presidential representative in southern Russia
to assign new “commissars”to sit on the boards of im-
portant local enterprises. Their task, said the Putin
man, would be “to defend the interests of the state
[by] pushing the enterprises to make full and accurate
payment of all their obligations to the budget, above
all, their taxes” (Kolbasin 2001).
In summary, to describe the 2001 reforms by saying
that “Russia instituted a flat tax”grossly distorts and
oversimplifies what happened.The tax rate on capi-
tal income was not zero, and in fact was higher than
the 13 percent rate in the PIT. Many deductions, ex-
emptions, and loopholes were closed. Social insur-
ance taxes and turnover taxes,the latter a particular-
ly damaging levy from an economic perspective,
were cut dramatically. Other taxes were changed. A
major effort at improved tax administration and en-
forcement occurred at the same time.
Revenue trends8
After the reforms were introduced, PIT revenue
rose by just over 20 percent as a share of GDP, from
2.4 percent of GDP in 2000 to 2.9 percent in 2001.9
While flat tax proponents are quick to attribute this
change to the tax rate structure,caution is warranted
for several reasons. First, personal income, as mea-
sured by the national income accounts, rose by 10
percent relative to GDP during the year.Second,the
enforcement and administration measures detailed
above likely reduced avoidance and evasion by sub-
stantial amounts. Third, restrictions on deductions
and exclusions – broadening of the base – undoubt-
edly helped as well. These factors alone could ex-
plain the entire revenue change. This view is sup-
ported by the fact that revenues from a variety of
other taxes also rose.Relative to GDP,revenue from
the VAT rose by 14 percent (from 6.3 percent of
GDP in 2000 to 7.2 percent in 2001), resource taxes
rose by almost 30 percent (from 1.1 percent of GDP
in 2000 to 1.4 percent in 2001),taxes on trade rose by
almost 20 percent, from 3.1 percent of GDP to 3.7
percent),excise taxes rose by about 15 percent (from
2.3 percent of GDP to 2.7 percent).
By 2004, however, the PIT had grown to 3.4 percent
of GDP, a more than 40 percent increase over its 2.4
percent share in 2000. Other than resource taxes,
which tripled as a share of GDP from 2000 to 2004,
the other taxes did not grow as significantly over the
7 Withholding at source and using taxpayer ID numbers would be
expected to improve compliance significantly. For example, in the
United States, forms of income that are withheld at source and re-
ported by third parties have enforcement rates of about 99 percent.
Forms of income  that are reported by third parties but not with-
held at source have compliance rates above 90 percent. Forms of
income that are neither reported by third parties nor withheld have
compliance rates around 70 percent or less. See Gale and
Holtzblatt (2002).
8 The data in this section are taken from Ivanova et al. (2005).
9 Real GDP itself grew at 5.1 percent in 2001, so real revenue
growth in the PIT was quite remarkable — 25.8 percent.2001 to 2004 period.Thus,a fuller explanation of rev-
enue trends is warranted.
The macroeconomic situation
Interpretation of revenue trends is likely to depend
in part on macroeconomic considerations, and two
issues in particular apparently can explain much of
the trends noted above.
First, beginning in February 1999, the world price of
Russia’s most important export commodity, oil, be-
gan a rise that would lead to its quadrupling within
19 months. Revenues from crude oil exports soared
from barely $2 billion in the first quarter of 1999 to
nearly $7 billion in the third quarter of 2000, to over
$20 billion by the second quarter of 2005. Kwon
(2003) estimates that 80 percent of the total post-
1998-crisis gains (of about 5 percentage points of
GDP) in the revenue of the general government
came from the oil sector, with the high oil prices ac-
counting for most of the gains.Tax reform, Kwon ar-
gues, played a secondary role and did so largely by
making the tax regime more elastic to oil prices. He
also shows that Russia’s revenue performance in the
post-crisis period did not differ from other oil-ex-
porting countries – even without a tax reform.
Second, wages grew rapidly after the debt crisis.
Ivanova et al. (2005, 19) point out that after-tax real
wage income grew by more than 18 percent in 2001,
while gross real wages grew at about 12 percent. Both
outpaced GDP growth, which was about 5 percent.
This procyclical pattern for labor is unusual compared
to other countries, but not compared to earlier
episodes in Russia, where real wages tend to over-
shoot GDP growth.Ivanova et al.conclude that “wage
developments thus appear to be a large part of any ex-
planation of the performance of PIT ... revenues.”
Microevidence on labor supply
Even more compelling evidence on the effects of the
tax rate changes can be obtained from microeco-
nomic data.A study by the IMF (Ivanova et al.2005)
uses panel data for the years 2000 and 2001.10
Employing a difference-in-differences approach,11
the IMF authors note that the 2001 changes raised
the marginal tax rate by 1 percentage point for peo-
ple who were in the 12 percent bracket before re-
form but reduced marginal rates by 7 and 17 per-
centage point for those in the 20 and 30 percent
brackets. If lower tax rates encourage labor supply
(or other economic behavior), one should see – oth-
er things equal – an increase in labor supply for peo-
ple who were originally in the 20 and 30 percent
bracket and a decrease for those in the 12 percent
bracket.Of course,other things may have been chang-
ing, so to account for changes over time, the authors
emphasize that the increase in labor supply should be
larger for those originally in the top two brackets than
for those in the lowest bracket.12
Their results are quite straightforward:Labor supply
did not change differentially across the groups. To
put it differently, there was no increase in labor sup-
ply in 2001 among households that faced high tax
rates in 2000,relative to households that faced the 12
percent rate in 2000.The results are inconsistent with
the notion that the cut in tax rates raised labor sup-
ply,and thus undermine any claim that the flattening
of tax rates in the PIT led to a big increase – or even
any increase – in economic activity in Russia.
Microevidence on compliance
The same IMF study (Ivanova et al. 2005) does find
significant evidence of an improvement in compli-
ance.The estimated compliance rate – based on com-
parisons of reported income and consumption – for
those originally in the 12 percent bracket was essen-
tially constant, at 74 percent in both years. The esti-
mated compliance rate for those in the top two
brackets in 2000 rose, from 52 percent in 2000 to 
68 percent in 2001.
It is possible that this change was due to the reduc-
tion in tax rates. It is also possible that the broaden-
ing of the tax base to tighten up on capital income
and the avoidance schemes noted above (for exam-
ple, insurance payments) could have had a signifi-
cant influence as well in the higher income group rel-
ative to the lower income group. Finally, it seems
likely that the efforts to crack down on evasion and
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10 The data are from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, a
household survey that provides data on income and other character-
istics of about 3,500 adults for most years between 1994 and 2002.
11 Their approach is similar to that taken by Feldstein (1995), Eissa
(1995), and others.
12The authors also point out that including the changes in social in-
surance tax rates implies net marginal tax rate reductions for both
groups, but the difference in tax rate changes between the two
groups expands because social insurance rates were cut (much)
more for high-income than low-income households.Thus,including
social insurance tax rates makes the test even stronger.CESifo DICE Report 1/2006 49
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to increase auditing and indirect assessment would
have had differential effects by income group. As a
result,it is hard to pin down why compliance rose for
higher-income groups.
It is interesting to note, however, that any notion of
a Laffer curve effect should be abandoned, for two
reasons. First, revenues collected from taxpayers in
the top two marginal tax rate groups in 2000 fell dra-
matically relative to revenue collected from the low-
est tax group.This is true both for the PIT and for the
sum of PIT and social insurance taxes. Second, Chua
(2003) estimates that in the absence of macroeco-
nomic effects and enforcement changes, revenues
from the PIT would have fallen by 0.2 percent of
GDP in 2001, or by about 10 percent.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that Russia has radically im-
proved the operation and structure of its tax system
in the past decade and that Russia has experienced
strong economic and revenue growth since the 
debt crisis in 1998.Understanding the links between
these two sets of events is complicated by many fac-
tors, including the complexity and wide range of tax
changes introduced and the enormous number of
factors that influence economic growth. While it
seems clear that simple statements like “the flat tax
caused significant growth in the economy and rev-
enues” are not supported by the evidence, it is also
undeniable that much additional work remains to
sort out the various causes and effects of policies in
the Russian transition.
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